The ongoing deregulation and convergence of energy markets have made it imperative for energy utilities to adopt systematic risk management policies. Effective implementation of these policies calls for adequate risk information, which is typically synthesized by combining inputs from several risk analysis methods. Many utilities select such methods informally, based on subjective perceptions of how well these methods contribute to the objectives of their risk management strategy. In this paper, we address this selection problem through decision analysis; specifically, we (i) develop a systematic multi-criteria framework for evaluating collections of risk analysis methods and (ii) report a case study where such collections were evaluated with a novel decision support tool which accommodates incomplete preference information. Drawing upon this case study, we argue that the development of a systematic framework can contribute to an improved understanding of key issues in risk management and engender potential savings due to better decision-making.
Introduction
In many parts of the world, energy markets are changing due to political and economic drivers. Deregulation and increasing competition have forced utilities to boost their efficiency. In effect, they must still manage the challenges of physical delivery while operating in a complex market characterized by significant volatility, volumetric uncertainty and credit risks. New instruments for enhanced market efficiency and risk hedging have been continually introduced by power exchanges such as the Scandinavian NordPool. At the same time, environmental concerns have become essential for the management of risks and profitability. For example, green certificate schemes have been launched in several countries, and European utilities are preparing for emissions trading which will start in the European Union in 2005. (See, e.g., [1] ).
For energy utilities, the development and implementation of an effective risk management policy is a strategic concern. In early 2003, for example, increased volatility in Scandinavian energy markets and high peak prices of electricity directed increasing attention to risk management and spurred an extensive debate on whether to invest in in-house risk management competence and systems or, alternatively, to outsource risk management functions to service providers. The in-house approach requires knowledge and levels of competency that may be too expensive for small utilities to achieve to the full. Yet negative experiences from outsourcing [2] have shown that in this approach, too, management still remains accountable for all risk-related decisions: it therefore has to understand these decisions well enough.
In this setting, a growing number of companies regard risk management as a strategic function that should not be outsourced. This development has created a need for a reevaluation of risk management policies, whereby core issues for re-thinking include (i) the clarification of risk management objectives at large and, moreover, (ii) the development of an adequate risk management system that is aligned with the objectives of the chosen risk management strategy and its operational targets. In this context, risk management can be seen as a multi-stage process in which risk analysis -the identification, elaboration and quantification of risks to which a company is exposedis a vital component. Eydeland et al. [3] , for instance, give an extensive coverage of risk management issues in the energy sector.
Briefly put, a utility needs effective risk analysis methods to optimize its risk-return profile and to control its risk exposure. These methods are ultimately implemented through IT systems for contract and risk management. The problem of identifying an adequate collection of risk analysis methods is consequently common to both energy utilities and providers of IT systems.
In this paper, we are predominately concerned with a situation where the selection and implementation of risk analysis methods is addressed jointly by the IT system provider and the utility who will take the system into use; this is usually the case at middlesized utilities or pools of smaller market players. In deregulated markets, these two types of players are in a more challenging position than large utilities which have typically invested plenty of resources in in-house risk management process development and related software. Small utilities, in contrast, may not have the requisite resources to adopt dedicated risk management software. Yet, pools of smaller market players have emerged during the past few years in countries with many small regional utilities, allowing these utilities to pursue collaborative activities in risk management and the execution of other business processes as well [4] . Although these pools are big enough to invest in risk management, they have usually little prior experience: thus, a jointly conducted assessment allows the pool participants to better understand each other's viewpoints and to align their risk management objectives.
Specifically, we develop a multi-criteria framework for the evaluation of alternative collections of risk analysis methods, in order to support the utility's risk management strategy. This evaluation framework -which can be seen as the first step in deriving requirements for the IT system provider's software development project -was created in the context of a case study in which the utility's operative risk management needs were analyzed, drawing upon the authors' extensive experience in deregulated energy markets, energy risk management, multi-criteria decision analysis and IT system development. We also discuss the potential benefits of the framework in helping utilities and IT system providers find more competitive solutions through the adoption of appropriate risk analysis methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Background and the decision context are presented in Section 2. Section 3 described the evaluation framework which provided the foundation for the case study reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. In principle, all units should have access to the same risk data at the same time. At the front-office, the risk management operation must be fast so that incremental risk calculations or contract valuations take no more than a few seconds when a deal must be decided upon. At the middle office, the accuracy and scope of risk information are vital because the time scale of operations is measured in minutes or hours. Back-office typically operates in a daily cycle, whereby the utility's size and market position place demands on its operative risk management practices. For example, a global player with a presence in multiple markets needs an integrated risk management system which provides aggregate measures for all its risk exposures and correlations between different markets. Conversely, a small local utility may adopt a centralized risk management system that is easy-to-use, flexible and cost-efficient. The utility's tolerance for risk and the educational level of its staff also need be recognized in the selection of appropriate risk management tools.
Choice of Risk Analysis

Decision Context
Typical business objectives of an energy utility are (i) to acquire enough energy to satisfy its contractual obligations at a minimum cost and (ii) to optimize the risk-return profile of its portfolio without taking risks that endanger the existence of the company.
In order to achieve these objectives, the utility needs an effective IT system which needs to be specified and implemented in recognition of these objectives.
The requirement specification for the IT system depends on the risk policy that is derived from business goals, the risk strategy that is part of general business strategy of the utility, as well as several demands on operative risk management practices. Once the requirements are identified and implemented through the IT system, this system defines the risk analysis framework in terms of the tools that are available for risk management purposes (see Figure 1 ). In this specification process, the varying time scales must also be observed. For example, while the IT system will be used for several years, the business needs in European energy markets are still in a transition phase so that they may change significantly during the system's lifespan. Consequently the utility's business and risk strategies must anticipate market developments and provide robust requirements for the IT system; yet the system and the chosen risk analysis methods should be sufficiently flexible. Business-related factors should provide guidelines on risk policy and requirements from the business perspective. The risk manager is responsible for converting these needs into sufficiently concrete requirements that are further refined by those responsible for operative risk management processes.
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Our main contributions lie in developing a framework for mapping key concerns in risk policy and risk strategy into requirements for a risk management system (Figure 1 ).
Specifically, building upon experiences from an actual case study, we focus on the decision problem of a utility that is about to implement an IT system for risk management. This system can provide risk information through different methods of risk analysis, whereby the costs and benefits of individual methods may be difficult to assess. Choices among alternative methods involve tradeoffs between the quality and usability of risk information (e.g., relevance, timeliness, accuracy, comprehensiveness) and the costs of (i) implementing, (ii) introducing, (iii) using, and (iv) maintaining these methods in the system: for example, raising the quantity and quality of relevant risk information leads to higher costs, but may nevertheless lead to lower total expected costs since risk information helps mitigate adverse events. Thus, the problem is to find an appropriate collection of risk analysis methods for the utility, in order to raise the quality of its risk management practices to a desired level.
For the purpose of developing the evaluation framework, we collaborated closely with two stakeholder groups. The first group (called 'user group') consisted of prospective users, the CEO and the risk manager of a European risk management service provider for small-and middle-sized utilities. The other group (called 'supplier group') consisted of two experts in energy risk management and IT system development with a total of more than 20 years of energy market experience. All group members were key decision makers in the implementation of the risk management system.
Risk Analysis Methods
Six methods of risk analysis methods were chosen for the case study. The choice was based on what methods are generally used on energy markets: (i) position reporting, (ii) scenario analysis, (iii) sensitivity analysis (Greeks), (iv) variance-covariance value-atrisk (Var/coVar VaR) and (v) simulated value-at-risk (see, e.g., [5] ). In addition, (vi) maximum loss (ML) was chosen as a challenging alternative for simulated VaR.
None of these methods alone delivers all the required risk information; but because it is not usually possible to implement all methods, the problem is that of choosing a suitable collection of methods that provides an adequate basis for risk management decisions. Towards this end, we first briefly discuss these methods because this provides a foundation for evaluating the collections.
Position Reporting
Position reporting refers to the monitoring of portfolio positions in terms of energy, cash flow, portfolio value, profits, losses or hedging level using spreadsheet-like tables and graphical charts. It is simple, intuitive and provides often enough support for simple hedging decisions; it is also straightforward to implement. One of the major disadvantages of position reporting is that it is not forward-looking. Also, the risks that lurk in plain numbers may be difficult to quantify. Because position reporting relies on user's expertise and intuition, it can also lead to 'number blindness' or the omission of important details.
Deterministic Scenario Analysis
In deterministic scenario analysis, scenarios of risk factors and market variables are employed to simulate how portfolio values depend on these scenarios. This approach can be readily configured because it does not rely on mathematical models or parameterisation. It also conveys information about the tails of the portfolio value distribution and helps identify risks caused by volatility and correlation shocks, for example. Although scenario analysis is flexible and can be implemented at a relatively low cost, it tends to require plenty of manual work and entails relatively high costs.
Another problem with scenario analysis is that it is rather subjective. Also, because no probabilities are usually assigned to scenarios, multiplicative or correlated effects are difficult to account for.
Greeks
Greeks are partial derivatives of portfolio value with regard to a given risk factor or market variable [6] . As such, they provide sensitivity measures that are relatively easy to comprehend and quick to calculate. However, Greeks are not suitable for non-linear instruments or for the analysis of large price deviations over long time horizons [6] . Nor do they tell anything about extreme risks, wherefore they should be regarded as a supplement to other risk calculations. Moreover, they are also subject to the same restrictions that apply to the underlying valuation model [6] . The implementation costs of Greeks are relatively high because an analytical valuation model is needed for all portfolio instruments, which in turn leads to higher maintenance costs and restricts the flexibility of this method.
VaR Models
Value-at-Risk (VaR) gives a measure of how low -or high -the value of a portfolio may be over a given time period at a given confidence level (conventionally 95% or 99%) [7] .
For example, an insurance company could report that the daily VaR of its trading portfolio is $20M at 99% confidence level, which means that the probability of a loss greater than $20M over the following day is 1%. VaR models are thoroughly tested and well-known. They quantify risks in an intuitive way and so that the resulting measure can be attributed to different portfolio components and risk factors. These models can also be used for rough sensitivity calculations by varying parameters. On the other hand, VaR measures can be misleading because they are usually backward-looking and do not convey information about the actual loss distribution; nor do they fulfil the subadditivity criterion of coherent risk measures (see Section 3.1). Variance-covariance VaR is not suitable for large moves and non-linear instruments, and the implementation of VaR models usually entails relatively high costs. The accuracy of simulated VaR measures can be difficult to assess. The required computations are demanding, which means higher costs of introduction and maintenance, as well as delays in the presentation of results.
Maximum Loss Model
The maximum loss model is defined as the maximum expected loss over a given period at a given confidence level (see [8] ). Because it is essentially an extension of the VaR methodology, the advantages and disadvantages of this method are largely similar to those of VaR (i.e, the method is rigorous, accounts for correlations, accommodates quadratic risk profiles and provides support for risk attribution). Moreover, risk factors are not restricted to the normal distribution, worst-case scenarios can be identified, no assumptions about profit and loss distribution are needed, and the marginal contributions or incremental risk can still be computed. However, maximum loss is not as well known as VaR, and requires consequently more training and justification for managers and regulators. Further disadvantages include complex and costly implementation, as well as demanding computations. [8] 
Collections of Risk Analysis Methods
Fundamentally, if the additional information provided by a specific method allows the DM to take improved actions, this method has value ex post and should be implemented if the gains in expected value exceed the total costs associated with the method. Here, a complication is that because the value of information is not additive, different methods cannot be dealt with in isolation but, rather, they must be considered in conjunction as collections of methods.
The number of relevant collections was reduced in the case study through several constraints. First, position reporting was regarded as such an elementary, cost-efficient and central component of any risk management system that it was included in all collections. Second, VaR and ML are relatively similar and respond to similar risk management needs; thus only one of these two methods was included in any collection.
With these constraints, there remained twenty collections of methods (Table 1) .
Simulation VaR refers to the Monte Carlo and historical simulation version of VaR: this is because historical simulation can be readily implemented with little additional costs once Monte Carlo simulation is in place. It should be noted that even though position reporting was included in all method collections, it was considered separately because its role in complementing other methods differed from one collection to another.
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The Evaluation Framework
The development of a suitable evaluation framework was challenging. This was because the choice of adequate risk analysis methods is complicated by the large number of relevant risk factors, meaning that an excessive focus on price risks, for instance, may detract attention from other risks (e.g., credit risks, liquidity risks). Moreover, alternative methods and associated risk measures are rarely commensurate; and there are also several subjective attributes -such as those related to information usabilitythat are important but often difficult to assess.
For the most part, attributes for the evaluation framework were elicited from the two expert groups through discussions which addressed their risk management needs, processes and practices (see Figure 2) . Attributes for information utility were based mainly on the authors' experience about the use of such information in risk management. The development of attributes for usability also benefited from the authors' experiences about what factors influence the usability of a risk management system in terms of its methodology and implementation as an IT system.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Information Utility
Five fundamental attributes were developed to assess the utility of information provided by different collections of risk analysis methods:
1. Measurement of catastrophic or extreme risks ('tail risk'): Ability to expose risks with a small probability but severe consequences.
2. Measurement of overall risk in normal situations: Ability to measure overall risk, for example unhedged exposure of energy portfolios, taking into account uncertainties in energy prices and in the production of hydropower and combined heat and power (CHP).
3. Measurement of risk sensitivities: Ability to indicate the sensitivity of risks to changes in parameters or variables (e.g. correlation shocks, changes in valuation model or volatility structure).
4. Attribution capability to risk factors: Ability to identify key risk factors in the portfolio and to distribute risk to these underlying factors.
5. Attribution capability to portfolio components: Ability to attribute risk to subportfolios or individual portfolio contracts or trades, as well as ability to measure incremental risk from adding new components to a portfolio.
Four sub-attributes were defined in order to evaluate how well alternative collections of risk methods handle risk measurements (as defined by the first three attributes listed above), i.e., 1) coherence, 2) intuitiveness, 3) accuracy and 4) robustness of a risk metric. Coherence was introduced by Artzner [9] to characterize four desirable properties, i.e., i) translation invariance, ii) homogeneity, iii) monotonicity and iv) subadditivity. The coherence of a metric was assessed by assigning equal weights (25%) to each of the four coherence properties. Intuitiveness refers to the simplicity, transparency and ease of understanding of the risk measures obtained from a specific collection of risk methods. This was a subjective evaluation that was assessed for each collection of risk analysis methods as a whole. Accuracy of risk measurement was assessed subjectively, taking into account method's quantification of risk and uncertainties in data measurement. Robustness was assessed by evaluating the method's ability to handle i) non-linearity, ii) non-normality and iii) extreme moves of risk factors, whereby these three properties were assigned an equal weight (33%).
Costs
The overall costs of using risk analysis methods in an IT-based risk management system consist of 1) implementation costs, 2) introduction costs, 3) usage costs and 4) maintenance costs. Implementation costs subsume all costs that are incurred during the implementation phase; these are much higher for complex methods that need more development effort and training than simple methods. Introduction costs include the costs of infrastructure (related to computational complexity), training costs and other introductory costs or fees. Usage costs are caused by data acquisition, computation time, as well as user operating and waiting time. In general, complex methods tend to be more costly, because they require highly educated personnel and are more timeconsuming to operate. Maintenance costs include costs related to model re-calibrations and maintenance, as well as update fees and personnel costs.
Implementation costs can be estimated on the basis of the methods' functional complexity (e.g., the number of working days that it takes to implement a functionality).
Similarly, introduction costs can be estimated by considering the costs of infrastructure and the number of consulting days for usage and maintenance training.
Although more difficult to estimate, usage costs are driven by the extent of daily use and costs of importing data from external sources. Maintenance costs can be estimated on the basis of license and update fees, plus the time and effort required by model recalibrations and updates. The calculation period for all costs is more than five years, which in our case was taken as the expected lifetime of the IT system.
Usability
Usability refers to the applicability and ease-of-use of a particular collection of risk analysis methods, as seen from the user's point of view. In the evaluation framework, this attribute was divided into four sub-attributes, i.e., flexibility, authority, intuitiveness and timeliness:
• Flexibility refers to the extent to which the collection is able to accommodate different risk factors and portfolio components (e.g., complex financial products).
• Authority is a measure of the method's credibility and prevalence. These are desirable properties, because approved methods are usually better understood, better known and there is more research on them. Approved and well-tested methods such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) are easier to justify and explain to senior management and regulators. They provide results that one can confidently rely on.
• Intuitiveness refers to the intellectual simplicity of a method and its working principles. This attribute also refers to the general usability which, however, depends strongly on the particular implementation.
• Timeliness can be measured quantitatively as the total sum of estimated times that the constituent methods in the collection take to produce their results.
Application of the evaluation framework in case study
By construction, methods of multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) help decision makers (DM) address problems with several possibly incommensurate objectives [10] , [11] . In value tree analysis, the attributes are organized in a hierarchical tree which consists of both higher-level attributes and twig-level attributes at the lowest level of the tree [12] (see, e.g., Figure 2 ). The relative importance of attributes is measured through weights, and the value of the performance of alternatives with regard to twiglevel attributes is assessed through scores. The overall value of an alternative is computed as an attribute-weighted sum of its scores.
More formally, let A={a1,…,an} be the attributes in the decision problem. The importance of ai is measured by its weight wi ∈ [0,1] so that the i-th attribute is more important than the j-th attribute if wi > wj, while the value of the alternative xj with regard to the i-th attribute is denoted by vi(xj). Now, the overall value of alternative can be written as V(xjj) = ∑ wj vi(xj) where the sum is taken over all lowest level attributes in the value tree.
The application of an additive preference model, as outlined above, assumes that the evaluation attributes are mutually preferentially independent, in the sense that the DM's preferences for score improvements with regard to any attribute are independent of what scores have been attained on other attributes. In Figure 2 , the three main attributes pertain to rather different dimensions of preferences, and thus it seems plausible that this requirement does hold at least as a viable approximation for the purposes of gaining insights into the properties of different risk analysis methods (although preferences for accuracy and robustness may not be totally independent, for example).
Rank Inclusion in Criteria Hierarchies
A potential shortcoming with conventional MCDM methods is that they require complete score and weight information. Such information, however, may be difficult to acquire, or even unnecessary for the purpose of deriving tentative conclusions about which alternatives are preferred to others. This realization has motivated the development of MCDM methods that accommodate incomplete preference information (see, e.g., [13] [14] [15] ). While the resulting dominance relationships of such methods are not necessarily conclusive, they nevertheless provide useful information about which alternatives are preferred to others.
In the case study, the evaluation framework was applied using a multi-criteria decision-making method called Rank Inclusion in Criteria Hierarchies (RICH) (see [16] ).
As one of the methods for dealing with incomplete preference information in hierarchical weighting models [16] , RICH allows the DM to associate a set of possible rankings with a given set of attributes. bounds on the weights can be added. As soon as some score and weight information is available, overall value intervals for the alternatives can be obtained by maximizing and minimizing the value of each alternative, subject to the corresponding constraints.
Because the overall values of the alternatives entail uncertainties (i.e., they are intervals), the RICH method features several decision rules which offer decision recommendations [16] . These include The RICH method was chosen for this case study because there are significant uncertainties in the alternatives' scores (i.e., how well do the alternative collections of methods perform with regard to the attributes?) and the weights (i.e., how important are these attributes?). With the RICH method, these uncertainties could be incorporated in the decision model. The value tree was captured by a recently developed decision support tool called RICH Decisions© [17] , whereafter the relevant collections of risk analysis methods were evaluated using the attribute hierarchy in 
Score elicitation
Scores for the different collections of methods were supplied by the authors. Although this made it possible to save time when working with the experts, this approach is not ideal as it would have been preferable to use several complementary sources of information. The use of relative large uncertainty intervals partly compensated for this deficiency, even if it did result in relatively large uncertainties in the alternatives' overall scores. However, it would have been difficult to obtain scores from other sources, because these assessments call for expertise on all methods and take a considerable amount of time to make. In this case, the elicitation of scores took about five working days. The normalized scores for the alternative collections are presented in Table 2.   PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 accuracy, intuitiveness, coherence and robustness for the three measurementattributes were not explicitly assessed; instead, these attributes were considered in the overall evaluation of the higher level attributes by averaging sub-attribute scores and aggregating these into a rounded uncertainty interval. The assessment of flexibility was based on the number of risk factors that a collection of methods is able to capture, as well as the degree to which more exotic instruments can be incorporated into risk calculations. Furthermore, it was deemed that the uncertainties in score elicitation could be captured through ±10% intervals for most scores. This uniform structure of uncertainty simplified and speeded up assessments. The scores were rounded to the resolution of 0,05.
Careful elicitation and validation of score information is essential but difficult. Ideally, the scores should be unbiased and context independent so that the scores are roughly the same regardless of context. In some cases, objective validation is possible because scores for costs or timeliness, for instance, can be obtained by examining the costs of implementing different collections of risk methods and by analyzing the relevance of the information that these collections provide. However, some scores are subjective so that a different approach is called for. For example, scores for information utility could be obtained in two ways:
1. The alternative collections can be empirically tested by using invented or historical scenarios and by simulating a priori decisions using the information provided by the respective collections. The corresponding results could then be compared to given scores, whereby the utility of the provided information methods could also be reevaluated. A wide variety of scenarios should be tested to account for different market situations. Here, a potential problem is that a function or a set of rules should be defined for using the information provided by the alternative collections. This is difficult in practice, but could perhaps be omitted if the same persons are asked to take risk management decisions on the basis of different collections and scenarios.
2. Several experts could be requested to assess the scores jointly and to produce a consensus judgment. For example, in the context of forecasting, it has been shown that group consensus tends to offer improved predictive power in comparison with individual forecasts (see [19] ).
Simulation results could also be used to derive scores for collections of methods, albeit this would entail similar problems as when using simulation for score validation.
Overall, the challenges of score validation need close attention.
Weighting of attributes
The attributes in Figure 2 were discussed extensively by the two groups of experts (i.e., user group and supplier group). The principles of the analysis were first explained to each group, whereby particular attention was paid to the explanation of the attribute hierarchy and the features of the RICH Decisions© decision support tool. Weights were assessed for the three upper-level attributes. The groups were encouraged to reach a consensus when making their statements: however, if a consensus was not quickly reached, the viewpoints in the groups were captured through more general preference statements. In each group the weighting process took about 30 minutes.
The user group supplied the following prefererence statements:
• Costs is the most important attribute.
• Information utility is the second or third most important attribute.
• Usability is the second or third most important attribute.
Information utility:
• Measurement of total risks is the most or second most important attribute.
• Measurement of extreme risks is the most or second most important attribute.
• Attribution to portfolio components is the third most important attribute.
• Attribution to risk factors is the least or second least important attribute.
• Measurement of sensitivity is the least or second least important attribute.
Usability:
• Flexibility is the most or second most important attribute.
• Simplicity is the most or second most important attribute.
• Timeliness is the least important attribute.
The preferences of the supplier group, consisting of experts in energy risk management and IT systems in a Finnish software company, were obtained in much the same way.
This resulted in the following statements:
• Information utility is the most important attribute.
• Usability is the second most important attribute.
• Costs is the least important attribute.
Information utility:
• Measurement of normal risks is the most important attribute.
• Measurement of extreme risks is the second most important.
• Measurement of sensitivity is the third most important attribute.
• Attribution capability to risk factors is the least important attribute.
• An additional constraint is put on weights that the lower bound of weights is one fourth of the average weight. This reflects the user group's view that all attributes are relatively important.
Usability:
• Intuitiveness and simplicity is the most important attribute.
• Flexibility is the second most important attribute.
• Authority is the least important attribute.
Results
Combining the two groups' preference statements with score information resulted in the value intervals in Figure 3 . For the user group, the application of the central value and maximax rules suggested that only position reporting should be implemented. The adoption of the maximin rule favored the selection of simulation VaR with Greeks, while the minimax regret rule suggested that scenario analysis and position reporting should be implemented. Overall, there were significant differences among the suggested collections, not least due to large differences in their costs. The implementation decision also depends on the willingness to take risks about which methods turn out to work best. The different decision rules reflect these different stances towards remaining uncertainties.
The above implementation recommendations can be regarded as tentative guidelines for the eventual system implementation. Interestingly enough, the case study also highlighted differences between the viewpoints of the user group and the supplier group, much in the same way as multi-criteria mapping can serve as a communication tool in assessing the costs of externalities (see, e.g., [20] ). Indeed, it appears that a closer scrutiny of these differences helps synthesize complementary viewpoints into requirements for a good risk management system.
Discussion
We have considered the choice of risk analysis methods to support the development of a risk management strategy and an associated IT system at an energy utility. Drawing upon lessons from a case study, we have argued that this kind of development work should be carried out jointly in close co-operation with the utility and the IT provider.
In particular, the development of a common framework of requirements on requisite risk information, based on the consideration of strategic and operative needs, was found to help the parties express their viewpoints on relevant risk management concerns. The RICH method was applied to obtain ordinal preference information on the importance of attributes from two expert groups which represented users and suppliers of risk management systems, while alternatives consisting of viable collections of risk analysis methods were assessed by the authors with regard to these attributes. This analysis produced several useful outlines of implementation recommendations.
With suitable modifications, the evaluation framework can be adapted for related problems contexts, such as the evaluation of forecasting methods or the analysis of methods for project risk management. Because the benefits of a systematic framework stem just as much from the support that it provides for critical reflection as from the use of numerical evaluation results per se, these benefits may be particularly notable in contexts where risks are largely judgmental, or even controversial. In view of these uses, too, the challenges of dealing with the non-additivities of risk information have received surprisingly little attention thus far. To some extent, the issue of information quality has been examined in the literature on information networks (see e.g. [21, 22] ), albeit applications such as internet searching differ markedly from the evaluation of strategically and tactically relevant risk information.
We feel that the multi-criteria framework for the evaluation of risk analysis methods is a contribution in its own right, because it can lead to a much enhanced understanding 
